{"id":"GHSA-qwpw-cwrq-333j","url":"https://compromised.live/t/GHSA-qwpw-cwrq-333j","kind":"compromised_package","tier":1,"severity":"critical","title":"Malicious code in @ubedsockets/baileys (npm)","summary":"Malicious code secretly makes every victim's WhatsApp account follow attacker-controlled channels as soon as it connects, letting the attacker push content through those accounts. npm package @ubedsockets/baileys, all published versions; a trojanized fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library. Remove @ubedsockets/baileys now and switch to the legitimate @whiskeysockets/baileys, then check your WhatsApp channel follows and project logs for unexpected newsletter subscriptions.","summary_source":"ai","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@ubedsockets/baileys","affected":"all versions","fixed":[]}],"epss":null,"kev":null,"first_seen":"2026-11-04T09:50:44.792Z","updated_at":"2026-11-04T09:50:44.792Z","status":"active","details":"Malicious package. `@ubedsockets/baileys` is a trojanized fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library (@whiskeysockets/baileys). On connection it issues an authenticated `w:mex` newsletter FOLLOW mutation (query_id 7871414976211147) that silently subscribes every victim to attacker-controlled WhatsApp channels — hardcoded newsletter JIDs: 120363410154606795@newsletter, 120363423295236859@newsletter. Legitimate Baileys never hardcodes a channel JID or auto-follows on connect; all published versions are malicious. Detected by wormsign static analysis of the injected channel-subscription code.\n\n---\n\nCredit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/6282ccd01cbcaeab639c2217d5515a4869847d8b/osv/malicious/npm/@ubedsockets/baileys/MAL-2026-18600.json))","aliases":["GHSA-qwpw-cwrq-333j"],"sources":[{"name":"ghsa","id":"GHSA-qwpw-cwrq-333j","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qwpw-cwrq-333j"}]}